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Economies diversify and then re-specialize as they develop. These “stages of diversiﬁcation” 
may result from productivity-driven structural change if initially resources are concentrated 
in industries other than those that dominate economic structure in the long run. 
A calibrated multi-industry growth model with many countries and with industry 
differences in productivity growth rates replicates the main features of the “stages of 
diversiﬁcation”. We also present evidence that countries systematically shift resources 
towards manufacturing industries with rapid productivity growth, and towards sectors 
with low productivity growth, consistent with the model and supporting the “productivity 
mechanism” for structural transformation.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Economic development is a joint process of economic growth and economic restructuring. It is well known that economic 
development tends to involve a shift of resources away from agriculture and towards services.3 In addition, Imbs and 
Wacziarg (2003, henceforth IW) show that there exist “stages of diversiﬁcation”: along the development path, countries 
begin with employment concentrated in a few industries, diversifying until they reach a certain threshold in income per 
capita beyond which they re-specialize. The ﬁnding that industrial specialization is U-shaped along the development path is 
more general than just a shift between specialization in agriculture to specialization in services: IW document the “stages” 
across 9 broad sectors and also across 28 manufacturing industries. Although this specialization pattern is arguably the 
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broadest stylized fact of structural transformation, the literature on structural transformation and growth has yet to account 
for the “stages of diversiﬁcation.” Accounting for the “stages” with a well-known mechanism of structural transformation is 
a “smoking gun” revealing the origins of structural transformation.
Our paper aims to ﬁll this gap in the literature. We show that persistent productivity differences across industries can 
account for the observed patterns of economic restructuring along the development path. We study a multi-sector model 
economy that highlights productivity growth differences across sectors, and also across manufacturing industries. We show 
that the pattern of diversiﬁcation followed by specialization can be accounted for simply by the dynamics of industry 
structure resulting from these differences, and we present empirical evidence that supports our hypothesis, underlining the 
importance of productivity growth as a factor of structural transformation.
Consider the following intuition. Suppose that markets are competitive, and that there are two goods that are substitutes
in consumption. Then, persistent differences in productivity growth rates lead to an increase in the GDP share of the industry 
with the most rapid productivity growth, as the good it produces registers a decline in its relative price – see Ngai and 
Pissarides (2007). However, if the economy starts out being specialized in the other industry, then the economy diversiﬁes 
until half of resources are devoted to each industry, after which it begins to specialize again. The economy exhibits a 
“U” shaped pattern of specialization along the development path. Conversely, suppose the goods are complements. Then, 
persistent differences in productivity growth rates lead to an increase in the GDP share of the industry with the slowest
productivity growth, also generating a “U” shape if the economy starts out specialized in the other industry.
First, we provide crucial evidence that, as they grow, countries indeed systematically shift resources among industries with 
different total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates. The literature suggests that goods are substitutes within manufacturing, 
whereas goods are complements across broad sectors: we would then expect that resources shift towards high-TFP growth 
industries within manufacturing, whereas resources shift towards low-TFP growth sectors. This is exactly what we ﬁnd in the 
data.
Then, we develop a multi-industry growth model in which productivity growth rates differ across industries. We calibrate 
initial productivity levels so as to reproduce the industry and sectoral composition of each of the 51 countries in the IW 
dataset in 1963, and allow the structure of the model economies to evolve over time based on persistent productivity 
growth differences across industries. Along the development path, the labor shares of different industries evolve due to 
disparities between their TFP growth rates. Applying the same non-parametric method as IW to the model-generated series 
of industrial structure, the calibrated model generates the U-shaped specialization pattern found in IW. Our results hold 
both within manufacturing and across broad sectors, and are robust to a number of variations in the calibration procedure. 
We conclude that differences in TFP growth across industries indeed contribute to the “stages of diversiﬁcation,” and that 
an important characteristic of the process of economic development is the reallocation of resources among industries with 
different rates of productivity growth.
Industry productivity growth rates are calibrated using US data. The use of common industry TFP growth rates across 
countries provides a clean experiment, as it abstracts from any inﬂuence that the stage of development or industrial struc-
ture itself might have on country-industry speciﬁc productivity growth rates, and it also implies the results are purely due 
to the impact of industry productivity differences on economic structure.4 At the same time, this assumption is consistent 
with the ﬁnding in Rodrik (2012) that there is unconditional convergence in labor productivity across countries among dis-
aggregated manufacturing industries. We perform several experiments allowing for productivity convergence dynamics and 
using different productivity measures, ﬁnding that the results are robust.
The literature has suggested several mechanisms underlying structural transformation, and our evidence supporting the 
importance of the productivity growth mechanism using industry and sector data from a broad set of countries complements 
the results of Herrendorf et al. (2013a, 2013b), who show that sectoral productivity growth differences are the main factor 
behind structural transformation among broad sectors in the US. We also provide evidence that other factors that theory 
suggests could be related to structural transformation are not signiﬁcantly related to the phenomena of interest.
We also make a methodological contribution to the computation of growth models along an unbalanced growth path. 
We follow Rogerson (2008), Duarte and Restuccia (2010) and others in computing transition dynamics in a multi-sector 
growth model without capital. This is for simplicity but also without loss of generality if capital shares are similar across 
industries. We also show that, if we allow capital shares to vary across industries, then not only do our results remain 
robust but also capital share differences on their own are unable to account for the stages of diversiﬁcation. Furthermore, in 
a technical appendix, we develop a growth model with capital, and show that our results are indeed similar in that context. 
We do not include it in the main text because there are important technical complications involved in computing such a 
model. In particular, the conditions shown in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) to be required for a balanced growth path do not 
hold empirically (the elasticity of substitution among capital goods is not one). Our results in the model with capital are 
important not only for robustness, but also because our simulation procedure for computing a model economy with many 
sectors in transition is of independent interest. It can be used in many contexts where a model does not admit a balanced 
growth path (for example, when production functions are not of Cobb–Douglas form as in Krusell et al., 2000 or He and Liu, 
2008).
4 For example, industry size is viewed by some as a potential determinant of productivity-enhancing R&D and hence possibly of productivity growth, 
although the evidence is mixed – see the surveys of Cohen (2011) and Ngai and Samaniego (2011). We wish to isolate the impact of productivity growth 
on economic structure from any potential feedback that might occur.
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Fig. 1. Specialization along the development path. Each point in the ﬁgure is the ﬁtted value αˆc (x) + βˆ (x) x from equation (1), where x is GDP per capita. 
Conﬁdence bands represent two standard errors of the coeﬃcient βˆ (x). The left panel is industry concentration within manufacturing estimated using 
INDSTAT3 data provided by UNIDO. The right panel is sectorial concentration across the entire economy estimated using ILO data. The middle line is the 
point estimate, whereas the other lines reﬂect the point estimate plus or minus two standard errors of βˆ (x), as in IW.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence concerning the evolution of economic structure 
along the development path, including evidence linking structural transformation to shifts in resources among industries 
with different rates of productivity growth. Section 3 describes the model, and Section 4 delivers the main results. Section 5
discusses factors of structural change other than the productivity mechanism in our model. Section 6 concludes with a 
discussion of possibilities for future work.
2. Diversiﬁcation and TFP growth differences
We begin by describing the stylized facts of how industrial structure evolves along the development path. First, we 
summarize the methodology and results of IW. Then, we provide new evidence that, along the development path, countries 
do indeed systematically shift resources among industries and sectors based on industry rates of productivity growth. This 
supports theories of productivity-driven structural change in general – not just as they relate to the stages of diversiﬁcation 
– so these results are important and of general interest.
2.1. Economic structure along the development path
IW use a non-parametric methodology to investigate the relationship between sectorial diversiﬁcation and income. 
Manufacturing industry data are drawn from the INDSTAT3 database distributed by UNIDO, whereas sector-level data are 
provided by the ILO, and data on aggregate income per capita are from the Penn World Tables. The industry share is de-
ﬁned as the share of manufacturing employment in the UNIDO data, and the sector share is deﬁned as the share of total 
employment in the ILO data. The sample period is from 1963 to 1992 and the data are annual.
IW use the Gini coeﬃcient of industry shares GINIc,t to measure the degree of industrial concentration in any country 
c at date t: the more equal the industry shares (i.e. the lower the Gini), the more diversiﬁed the economic structure.5
Then, they apply a procedure related to robust locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess) to uncover the link between 
income per capita GDPc,t and specialization. Speciﬁcally, they regress the Gini coeﬃcients of industrial specialization on 
income per capita with country ﬁxed effects, using rolling income windows.
GINIc,t = αˆc (x) + βˆ (x)GDPc,t + c,t, GDPc,t ∈ [x− /2, x+ /2] . (1)
The income interval size  is ﬁxed at $5000 (in 1985 dollars) and the midpoint x of the interval gradually moves away from 
the previous income range (the increment across regressions is $25). Then, they plot the ﬁtted Gini coeﬃcients estimated 
at the midpoint of the income interval in each regression. They ﬁnd a U-shaped relationship between Gini coeﬃcients and 
income levels. Their U-shaped relationship is robust across sectors that account for the entire economy of the countries 
concerned6 (ILO data) and within manufacturing (UNIDO data). Fig. 1 reproduces their main results.
5 Although IW focus on Gini coeﬃcients, they use several other measures of specialization for robustness. We focus on Gini coeﬃcients too, but results 
for other measures are available upon request.
6 The 9 sectors are Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas and Water; Construction; Whole-
sale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels; Transport, Storage and Communication; Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services; and 
Community, Social and Personal Services (including government).
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Fig. 2. Trends along the development path in the TFP growth bias of employment, within manufacturing and across sectors. The middle line is the point 
estimate, whereas the other lines reﬂect the point estimate plus or minus two standard errors of βˆ (x), as in IW. In this graph we normalize the industry 
or sector TFP growth measure so that the mean industry or sector measure is zero and the standard deviation across industries or sectors is one.
The literature on structural transformation has tended to focus on the dynamics of a few industries or sectors, and 
several theoretical accounts of various aspects of structural transformation exist. However, the “stages” are a feature of 
structural transformation across 28 industries and 9 sectors, at different levels of aggregation. Relating the behavior of 
so may industries and sectors to any single mechanism would constitute important progress in identifying which are the 
empirically important mechanisms of structural transformation.
2.2. Productivity and structural change
We argue that these patterns can be related to systematic shifts of resources between industries that experience different 
rates of productivity growth. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) show that, if goods are substitutes, then in equilibrium resources 
should shift towards industries with rapid productivity growth. If goods are complements, then in equilibrium resources 
should shift towards industries with low productivity growth. This productivity mechanism of structural change would then 
be capable of generating the stages of diversiﬁcation, if initial conditions are skewed away from the industries or sectors 
that dominate in the long run.
Empirically, along the development path, do we indeed observe resources moving between industries systematically 
based on their productivity growth rates? To answer this question, we require information as to whether the elasticities of 
substitution across goods are greater or less than unity, as well as measures of productivity growth for the industries and 
sectors considered in IW.
Across broad sectors, it is generally thought that the elasticity of substitution is less than one – see Ngai and Pissarides
(2004) and Herrendorf et al. (2013a, 2013b). However, within manufacturing, the elasticity of substitution is thought to be 
more than one – see Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2012). Thus, our hypothesis has two 
strong predictions:
1. Across broad sectors, as countries develop they shift resources towards low-TFP growth sectors.
2. In contrast, within manufacturing, as countries develop they shift resources towards high-TFP growth industries.
To test whether the data support these predictions, we need a measure of productivity growth gi for different sectors 
and different manufacturing industries. We obtain these using US data in a manner described in detail in our quantitative 
experiments in Section 4. In brief, we compute gi for manufacturing industries using productivity data from the NBER-CES 
manufacturing industry database and, given a value for manufacturing, we compute gi for broad sectors using trends in 
the prices of the goods produced by each sector relative to manufacturing, as reported by the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. TFP growth rates gi in this experiment are assumed constant in each industry across time and across countries, so 
any observed patterns are solely due to changes in economic structure along the development path towards or away from 
industries with rapid TFP growth – not due to changes in industry TFP growth.
Using these measures, we deﬁne the TFP growth bias of employment as the sum of employment shares across sectors mul-
tiplied by gi , for a given country at a given date, using the ILO data. We also compute this statistic within manufacturing 
using the UNIDO data. This is an indicator of how resources are allocated across industries or sectors with different TFP 
growth rates. Then, we examine the empirical relationship between this statistic and GDP per capita (as well as between 
average TFP growth within manufacturing and GDP per capita) by applying the non-parametric method in IW to this mea-
sure instead of the Gini coeﬃcient of industry shares. This tells us whether there are systematic shifts in resources across 
industries with different TFP growth rates along the development path.
Fig. 2 shows the estimated curves of industry- and sector-weighted average TFP growth bias of employment. Within 
manufacturing, there is a mostly positive relationship with income, indicating that economic structure shifts towards indus-
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Fig. 3. Trends in industry shares along the development path. The curves represent the link between industry shares and income per head for the highest-
and lowest-TFP growth industries, Non-electrical Machinery and Tobacco, computed using the IW methodology.
Fig. 4. Relationship between slopes in industry shares along the development path and TFP growth rates. The slopes are derived by applying the IW method 
to individual industry shares. UNIDO classiﬁcation for manufacturing industries.
tries with rapid TFP growth. In the ILO sector data, by contrast, there is a negative relationship. This is exactly what we 
would expect if TFP growth differences are an important factor or structural transformation along the development path, 
and it is striking that the opposite is happening within manufacturing and across broad sectors, consistent with the view in 
the literature that manufacturing goods are substitutes whereas sector-level goods are complements.
Another way of testing these predictions is to examine whether changes in the shares of individual industries along 
the development path are systematically related to gi . If the behavior of individual industries is consistent with our hy-
pothesis – not just aggregated statistics such as the TFP growth bias of employment – this provides strong supporting 
evidence.
To obtain a picture of how individual industry shares are related to GDP, we use the IW method, estimating equation (1)
with the dependent variable being the share of a given industry rather than the Gini coeﬃcient. This leads to 9 estimated 
curves at the sector level, and 28 estimated curves within manufacturing.
Based on our hypothesis, industry shares grow in proportion to industry gi . Thus, within manufacturing, we would 
expect the industry with the highest gi to have a share that increases with GDP (ISIC 382, Non-electrical Machinery), and 
the industry with the lowest gi to have a share that decreases with GDP (ISIC 314, Tobacco). Fig. 3 shows that this is exactly 
what we observe.
More broadly, comparing across all industries in manufacturing, we would expect the slope of the relationship between 
the share of a given industry and GDP to be positively related to its level of gi . Indeed, the correlation between the slopes 
and gi is 0.60 – see Fig. 4.
All these results should be reversed when we look at broad sectors. For example, we would expect the sector with the 
highest gi to have a share that decreases with GDP (ISIC 1, Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing), and the sector with 
the lowest gi to have a share that increases with GDP (ISIC 9, Community, Social and Personal Services). Fig. 5 shows that 
this too is exactly what we observe. More generally, the correlation between the slopes of the estimated share curves and 
gi should be negative: the correlation coeﬃcient is in fact −0.65, see Fig. 6. Since there are only 9 sectors the robustness 
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Fig. 5. Trends in sector shares along the development path. The curves represent the link between industry shares and income per head for the highest-
and lowest-TFP growth industries, Agriculture and Community Services, computed using the IW methodology.
Fig. 6. Relationship between slopes in sector shares along the development path and TFP growth rates. The slopes are derived by applying the IW method 
to individual sector shares. ILO classiﬁcation for broad sectors.
of this result is worth checking: the correlation remains negative (sometimes higher, sometimes lower) if we remove any 
of the 9 sectors individually. In particular, excluding manufacturing (which might behave differently from other industries 
because it produces capital goods as well as consumer goods), the correlation rises in magnitude to −0.77.
A consequence of the productivity mechanism of structural transformation is that, if the ranking of industry TFP growth 
rates is similar across countries, or if there is convergence in productivity growth rates, countries should converge to a 
common structure along the development path. Moreover, economic structure should converge to that of a technologically 
advanced, wealthy economy. To check this prediction, we proxy for the structure of an “advanced economy” using the US 
structure in 1992 (the end of the IW data) and compute the country correlation with this structure for each date. The 
correlation between economic structure and the structure of the US is clearly increasing along the development path, see 
Fig. 7 (note, we do not include the US in this exercise). We found a similar ﬁgure when we used the latest UNIDO and ILO 
data on US structure (2005 and 2007 respectively).
We conclude that countries do shift resources from high-TFP growth manufacturing industries to low-TFP growth manu-
facturing industries along the development path. The data also indicate that countries shift resources from low-TFP growth 
sectors to high-TFP growth sectors along the development path. These results provide compelling evidence in support of 
the productivity mechanism of structural change, analyzed in detail in Ngai and Pissarides (2007). At the same time, these 
ﬁndings alone do not provide evidence that the specialization pattern we observe in the data is explained by this mech-
anism. Depending on initial conditions, productivity driven structural change might lead only to a trend of diversiﬁcation, 
or to a trend of only specialization, or neither. Thus, to explore speciﬁcally whether these forces are related to a trend of 
diversiﬁcation followed by specialization, we develop a general equilibrium model of productivity-driven structural change, 
and explore the evolution of structural change in a calibrated version of the model.
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Fig. 7. Correlation between industry shares and the industry shares of an advanced economy, by income per capita. For each country-date we compute the 
correlation of industry shares with industry shares in the US in 1992. Then we apply the IW non-parametric procedure to see how this statistic is related 
to income per head. The dotted line is for board sectors and the full line is for manufacturing.
3. Model economy
We now present a simple model that can account for these shifts in employment among industries and sectors based on 
productivity growth differences, as well as accounting for the stages of diversiﬁcation.
Suppose there are N competitive industries, and C countries, with production functions of the form:
ycit = Act Aitncit (2)
where yict and nict are output and labor in industry i, country c at date t . Productivity Ait grows according to Ait = Ai0gti
and Act is arbitrary for now. The growth factor gi may vary across industries. As is common in the structural transformation 
literature we abstract from capital to focus on the productivity mechanism, but discuss capital later in Section 5.7
Producers solve the problem
max
nit
{pcit ycit − wctncit} (3)
where pict is the price of good i, and wct is the wage.














ξi = 1 (4)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution among goods and yct = {y1ct, . . . , yNct}. The agent is endowed with one unit of 










pict yict ≤ wct ∀t
where U (x) = x1−σ −11−σ .
Henceforth we suppress the country subscripts c except where needed. Let vit be value added in industry i, so vit =
pit yit where pit is the price of good i. Then deﬁne the growth factor of value added Git as:
Git = vi,t+1/vit .
7 We abstract from intermediate goods because it would not signiﬁcantly affect results. See Appendix B for details.
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On the supply side, it is straightforward to show that AitA jt =
p jt
pit









Let si,t be the share of manufacturing value added of industry i at date t . Given shares si,t in any year t , we can compute 
shares for the next year t + 1 by multiplying si,t by gε−1i , re-scaling so the shares add to one,8 and repeating this procedure 
to get predicted shares for as many years as desired. Thus, given initial conditions, we can compute model-generated 
industry shares by induction for future years, and subject the resulting industry structure to the same non-parametric
methodology as in IW to study whether productivity differences might be able to generate a U-shaped specialization pattern.
Notice that equation (6) also holds if we deﬁne Git = ni,t+1/nit . To see this, remember the household’s ﬁrst order condi-
















. Rearranging, we have 
that nitn jt =
pit yit
p jt y jt
= vit/v jt .
4. Quantitative experiments
4.1. Calibration
We now examine whether the model presented above generates a U-shaped specialization pattern for the 9 sectors in 
the ILO data, which cover the entire private economy. To do this requires values of gi for each industry or sector, as well as 
the elasticity ε, preference parameters ξi , initial productivity levels Ai,0 and a series for country productivity Ac,t .
To measure gi for different sectors, we ﬁrst take the manufacturing sector value of gi to equal the average value of total 
factor productivity derived from the NBER manufacturing industry database, over the period 1963–1992. Then, we calibrate 
gi for the other sectors using their inverse price growth rates relative to manufacturing, using price data drawn from the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis. See Table 1 in Appendix C for the gi values.
Using US data, Herrendorf et al. (2013a, 2013b) estimate that ε = 0 across agriculture, manufacturing and services. Thus, 
we set ε = 0 across broad sectors.
As a benchmark we assume that the values of gi are constant across countries. The use of common TFP growth rates 
across countries provides the cleanest experiment, since it is only the initial conditions that vary across countries. For 
example, empirical country-speciﬁc TFP growth rates could be inﬂuenced by industrial structure: as discussed in the survey 
of Cohen (2011), industry size is viewed by some as a potential determinant of productivity-enhancing R&D and hence 
possibly of productivity growth – although it is worth noting that the evidence regarding this link is inconclusive, see 
Cohen (2011) and Ngai and Samaniego (2011). Later we will check the robustness of our results by allowing for convergence 
dynamics. In any case, country-speciﬁc measures of industry TFP growth do not exist for a wide sample of countries.
We set the utility weights ξi = 1/N , where N is the number of sectors or industries in the model. This is without loss of 
generality as it amounts to a normalization of the units used to measure production in each industry.9 We set Ai0 to match 
the sector shares in the initial year as reported in the ILO data.
Finally, we select Act to match GDP per person for each country in each year. Since Act affects all industries equally, it 
does not impact economic structure. We also develop and calibrate a version of the model that has capital and generates a 
series for real GDP based on the investment motive as well as changes in consumption patterns: that model is relegated to 
the Technical Appendix because it turns out to entail considerable computational complications that obscure the simplicity 
of our results.
Our simulation procedure is as follows. For each country, we match the initial industry shares in 1969 drawn from the 
ILO database, and simulate a time series of future industry shares from 1970 until 1992 using equation (6). We then include 
the same country–time pairs as IW, so that we have a model-generated unbalanced panel of industry shares that is of the 
same dimensions as that in the IW data. We apply the IW non-parametric procedure to the model-generated industrial 
structure, and compare the ﬁtted curves that link economic structure to GDP per head.
8 Given si,t , let zi,t+1 = si,t gε−1i . Then si,t+1 = zi,t+1/ 
∑N
j=1 z j,t+1.
9 For example, suppose we measure apples in numbers of apples and ﬁnd that ξapples = 1 and Aapples,0 = 1. We could choose to measure apples in units 
of “half an apple”, then ξapples = 0.5 and Aapples,0 = 2.
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Fig. 8. Industry structure along the development path in the simple model. The left panel is the relationship between income and specialization within 
manufacturing. The right panel is the same relationship across broad sectors.
We also perform this exercise independently for the 28 manufacturing industries examined in IW. These are the in-
dustries in the ISIC revision 2 industry classiﬁcation used by the UNIDO INDSTAT3 database. This requires an independent 
calibration of the model. The procedure is exactly the same as above.
For our manufacturing simulation, we estimate gi using the TFP values in the NBER manufacturing productivity database. 
Note that the NBER industry classiﬁcation is 4-digit SIC. As is standard, we use Domar weights to aggregate NBER SIC 
industry TFP growth values into values for the ISIC revision 2 classiﬁcation used by UNIDO. The value of gi is the industry 
average over time.10 See Table 2 in Appendix C for the values of gi .
For manufacturing data we require a different value of ε. We use the value ε = 3.75, which is estimated in Ilyina 
and Samaniego (2012). Finally, as before, we use the initial industry shares in 1963 from the UNIDO employment data, 
and simulate a time series of future industry shares until 1992 using equation (6). To the subsample of these data that 
correspond to the entries in the IW data, we apply the IW non-parametric procedure to extract the model link between 
income and specialization.
4.2. Results
We follow the IW methodology and regress Gini coeﬃcients generated by our simulation on income per capita. Our 
results display a similar U-shaped relation between sector concentration and income levels: see Fig. 8. In addition, the 
turning point is roughly $9000, as found by IW. This is the same across broad sectors and within manufacturing data, 
something that lends weight to the empirical relevance of the productivity mechanism.
How important is the assumption that gi is constant across time and space? Exploring this question requires imposing 
some structure on the manner in which productivity growth might vary across time and space, drawing on the related 
literature. We draw on the ﬁnding of Rodrik (2012) that there is unconditional convergence in productivity levels across 
manufacturing industries. This would suggest that, if a less developed economy c has productivity growth factor gict at 
date t , then gict → gi over time.11
Suppose that




where xc,t = Yc,t/YUS,t is the relative GDP gap between country c and the United States, and gct = Ac,t+1/Ac,t is a country-
speciﬁc productivity term. Thus, productivity convergence is a function of relative income, as is typically assumed in the 
empirical growth literature – see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). In equilibrium, changes in industry shares 

























10 For robustness we also estimated gi in three other ways, all of which generate estimates that are highly correlated with each other. First, we used 
the perpetual inventory method to derive productivity growth measures for the US from the UNIDO data itself. Second, we used the growth gap between 
industry value added and industry production indices in the UNIDO data as indicators of relative price changes in the US. Third, we derived a measure 
of gi from the observed changes in employment patterns around the world: this measure of gi provides an extremely tight ﬁt to the data. Details are in 
Appendix A.
11 Unfortunately industry TFP data exist for only a small set of mostly developed countries. The ﬁnding of Rodrik (2012) relates to labor productivity: 
however it is hard to think of reasonable conditions under which labor productivity would converge while TFP does not. Note also that Rodrik (2012) tests 
for convergence in productivity levels, which is a stronger condition than convergence in productivity growth rates.
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Fig. 9. Industry structure along the development path allowing for convergence in TFP growth rate across countries. Productivity growth gict equals gct g
xηc,t
i
where the output gap xc,t is deﬁned as Yc,t/YU S,t .
Thus, convergence dynamics do not in fact affect industry structure! The only way in which productivity convergence could 
affect our results is if the convergence function f is different across industries. For example, suppose that




If η < 0, poorer countries experience disproportionately rapid convergence in high-gi industries, capturing the idea that in 
high-gi industries there is greater room for catchup. If η > 0, then the reverse is the case – catchup is relatively slow in 
high-gi industries, as in the model of Ilyina and Samaniego (2012) where barriers to technology transfer in less-developed 
economies limit the R&D that would be necessary for them to catch up in high-tech industries. The study of Duarte and 
Restuccia (2010) suggests that empirically η > 0, as they ﬁnd that productivity growth in the US is higher in agriculture 
than in manufacturing, and that this gap is correlated with income.
To explore the impact of industry-speciﬁc convergence, we solve the manufacturing model with values η ∈ {−0.3,0.3}. 
A value of −0.3 implies that the difference in log gi between any two industries or sectors is doubled in a country with 
10 percent of US GDP per head. A value of 0.3 implies that the difference in log gi between any two industries or sectors 
is halved in a country with 10 percent of US GDP per head. In general, negative values of η lower than −0.3 or −1 may 
imply huge industry productivity growth differences across industries that are not reasonable. On the other hand, there is 
nothing a priori unreasonable about positive values: even η → ∞ just means that TFP growth rates are roughly the same in 
all industries.
The results show that, although the exact shape of the specialization curve is sensitive to the value of η, the U-shape 
in manufacturing is preserved, see Fig. 9. The results with η = 0.3 are better in the sense that, when η = 0.3, the initial 
diversiﬁcation stage is monotonic, whereas in the benchmark results the lowest income countries seemed to display a 
little specialization at ﬁrst. Thus, the results are robust to allowing for convergence in industry productivity growth rates – 
particularly if convergence is slower in high-TFP growth manufacturing industries, e.g. due to barriers to technology transfer.
4.3. Goodness of ﬁt
Our aim is to see whether the calibrated model can generate a U-shaped pattern of specialization. At the same time, 
since we explore different versions of the model, it is useful to have some measures to compare the relative ﬁt of different 
specialization curves.
First, we adopt a broad criterion for whether or not the model is generating “stages of diversiﬁcation.” Recall that the 
IW procedure involves regressing specialization measures on income within a window of income [x− , x+ ], and then 
plotting the ﬁtted value. We now study in addition the link between income and the coeﬃcients generated in each of these 
regressions. If the model is itself generating the “stages” then not only should the ﬁtted values in the IW regression display 
a “U” shape but the coeﬃcients βˆ (x) in these regressions should be increasing in income x, just as the slope of a “U” shape 
is monotonically increasing. The best ﬁt will be obtained if, in addition, there is a threshold level of income below which 
the coeﬃcients are negative and above which they are positive. IW ﬁnd that the data do indeed display such a threshold, 
see Fig. 10.
First, we look at whether the model coeﬃcients βˆ (x) are increasing. This implies that industry dynamics in the model 
economy are generating the U-shape, as opposed to having the initial “diversiﬁcation” stage being driven by the window-
speciﬁc intercepts. Across broad sectors Fig. 10 shows that, for the benchmark value of η = 0 (the case where rates of 
convergence are symmetric across industries) the coeﬃcients show that the model itself is indeed generating the “stages.” 
The coeﬃcients are broadly increasing in income, starting negative and ending positive. The same holds for values of η that 
are positive, or negative but not too large in magnitude. Thus we conclude that our sector-level results are very robust to 
different convergence dynamics.
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Fig. 10. Coeﬃcients βˆ (x) in the Gini regressions over income according to the IW procedure, where GINIc,t equals αˆc (x)+ βˆ (x)GDPc,t +εc,t , for GDPc,t values 
in the window [x− /2, x+ /2], across broad sectors in the ILO data. The top left panel is based on data from IW, the other panels are model-generated.
Fig. 11. Coeﬃcients βˆ (x) in the Gini regressions over income according to the IW procedure, where GINIc,t equals αˆc (x) + βˆ (x)GDPc,t + εc,t , for GDPc,t
values in the window [x− /2, x+ /2], across manufacturing industries in the UNIDO data. The top left panel is based on data from IW, the other panels 
are model-generated.
Fig. 11 plots the regression coeﬃcients within manufacturing. In this case, when η = 0 the coeﬃcients are all positive 
and not upward-sloping below about $6000. This suggests that the intercepts play a part in matching the downward slope 
of the “U” below this level of income. The same is true when η < 0. However, when η = 0.3, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients 
are upward-sloping. When η = 1, we ﬁnd that they are upward-sloping and negative below about $5000. Thus, the best 
ﬁt of the model is when η > 0, so that TFP growth differences among industries are compressed in developing countries, 
consistent with the presence of barriers to technology transfer as in Ilyina and Samaniego (2012).
In Appendix D we also examine whether the shapes of the model-generated curves are similar to the data. Once more, 
the sector model ﬁts the data well in general, whereas the manufacturing model ﬁts best when η > 0.
5. Factors of structural transformation
Our model focuses on productivity differences as the motor of structural change. However, there are other theories of 
long-run structural change that imply a shift in resources towards particular industries in the long run. As long as countries 
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Fig. 12. Trends in average ﬁrm size, R&D intensity and labor intensity within manufacturing along the development path. The pattern of R&D intensity is 
consistent with TFP growth being related to R&D spending. The other measures do not display a monotonic relationship with income.
begin specialized in industries other than those that dominate in the long run, those models too might predict stages of 
diversiﬁcation.
At least four general equilibrium frameworks have recently been developed to think about long-term structural change12:
1. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) emphasize persistent productivity differences across industries, as we do.
2. Ilyina and Samaniego (2012) emphasize productivity differences driven by differences in desired R&D intensity. This 
theory is not at odds with that of Ngai and Pissarides (2007), but digs deeper as to the underlying causes of TFP growth 
differences.
3. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) argue that, in addition, differences in capital shares across industries could be a factor 
of structural change, since capital deepening along the growth path could have a differential impact on industries 
depending on their capital intensity.
4. Buera and Kaboski (2012) argue that structural change is affected by industry differences in ﬁrm size, with poorer 
countries less able to afford large-scale technologies.
Is there a way to see whether any of these other mechanisms is related to the “stages”? To answer this question, we try 
two approaches. First, we see whether measures of R&D intensity, labor intensity and ﬁrm size display any clear relationship 
to the stages of development. Second, we adapt our model to allow for differences in capital shares across industries, to see 
whether the capital intensity mechanism might contribute to the “stages” in the model.
5.1. Empirical evidence
To see whether structural change appears empirically related to any of the factors of structural change other than TFP 
growth rates (R&D intensity, capital intensity, ﬁrm size), we repeat the experiment illustrated in Fig. 2 and compute series 
for the weighted average of each of these measures for each country over time. Industry R&D intensity and capital intensity 
measures are 3-decade averages of the values reported in Ilyina and Samaniego (2011).13 The industry ﬁrm size is the 
average number of employees per establishment in the US over the period 1963–1992, as reported by UNIDO in INDSTAT3. 
Then, as in Section 2, weighted averages are computed for each country–year, where the weights are value added shares of 
each industry in total manufacturing, computed using UNIDO data. Finally, we apply the same non-parametric method to 
these measures, examining their relationship to real GDP per capita.
Fig. 12 shows the link between each of these measures and income using the IW method. Average R&D displays a positive 
relationship with income within manufacturing, indicating that, behind the “stages of diversiﬁcation,” economic structure 
shifts towards industries with rapid TFP growth, and industries with high R&D intensity. Fig. 12 also shows a link between 
12 In addition to the listed theories, Kongsamut et al. (2001) relate structural change to differences in requirements for different goods – so that, for 
example, instead of utility over consumption of good i being deﬁned over ci , it is deﬁned over ci − c¯i , where c¯i > 0 is a constant. We do not think of 
this account of structural change as being relevant for the “stages” because c¯i is generally interpreted in terms of requirements for agricultural goods, 
something that is not obviously relevant for disaggregated manufacturing industries. At the sector level, we have 9 sectors, so again requirements would 
likely be relevant for at most one sector.
13 R&D intensity is the median R&D spending as a share of capital expenditures among ﬁrms in Compustat. Capital intensity is one minus the wage share 
of value added in the INDSTAT3 database.
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Fig. 13. Relationship between slopes in industry shares along the development path and different potential factors of structural transformation. The slopes 
are derived by applying the IW method to individual industry shares. The measures in the x-axes are scaled so that the mean is zero and the standard 
deviation is one.
average R&D intensity and income for the broad sectors in the ILO data14: in this case the trend is downwards, consistent 
with the assumption that ε < 1 across sectors. These results support the assumption that TFP growth differences can be a 
driving force behind structure change along the development path, and that behind the scenes TFP growth is related to R&D 
intensity.
Regarding the other measures, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) argue that differences in capital shares could be a driving 
force behind structural change. We can see that capital intensity shows a U-shaped relationship with income. In particular, 
capital intensity increases beyond the income level of $10,000. Thus, while capital shares may be a factor of structural 
change, they do not appear to play a monotonic role throughout the “stages.” This justiﬁes our focus on a model with 
productivity differences, abstracting from differences in capital shares. Later we will show that capital intensity differences 
are not a key determinant of stages of diversiﬁcation in the model either.
Average ﬁrm size declines along the development path before ﬂattening out, which does not obviously support the idea 
that countries are more able to overcome large optimal scales of production as they develop. This does not mean that the 
scale of production is not relevant for understanding some aspects of economic structure (e.g. Buera and Kaboski, 2012
show it is relevant for understanding resource shifts between the home and the market), but it is not obviously related to 
the “stages.”
Finally, Fig. 13 displays the correlations between the slopes of individual industry shares from Section 2 and each of the 
industry measures. R&D intensity is positively related to the slopes in manufacturing and negatively related across broad 
sectors: this is as expected, but the relationships are not as strong as the link between slopes and TFP growth rates in 
Figs. 4 and 6. For capital intensity there is no visible relationship, suggesting that it is not a strong factor of structural 
transformation (at least not within manufacturing). Firm size is negatively related to the slopes, which again is the opposite 
of what we would expect if higher income enables the growth of industries that tend to have large ﬁrms.
5.2. Capital shares
So far we have assumed that there is no capital in our model. This is without loss of generality as, if capital shares 
are the same across industries then the pattern of structural change implied by the model would be the same. To see this, 
suppose the production function includes capital: yit = Aitkαitn1−αit . The ﬁrst order conditions can be written pitαyit/Kit = rt
(where r is the interest rate) and pit(1 −α)yit/nit = wt . Dividing one condition by the other we get that Kitnit =
αwt
(1−α)rt . Then, 
dividing any of the ﬁrst order conditions for industry i by that for j yields the result that pitp jt =
A jt
Ait
so, as before, structural 
change is driven by equation (6) even when we allow for capital.
What might happen if there are industry differences in capital shares? Suppose now that
yit = Ait Kαiit n1−αiit (7)
where capital shares αi may vary across industries. Now it is no longer the case that 
pit
p jt
= A jtAit in equilibrium. Instead, 
pit
p jt
becomes a function of the capital shares αi , the wage wt and the interest rate rt . Letting Gi equal value added growth 
in industry i, in equilibrium it can be shown that:
14 For most measures, unfortunately we do not have data for sectors outside of manufacturing.











which reduces to the earlier expression (6) when the capital shares are the same. In expression (8), gwgr is the growth factor 
of the wage rate divided by the growth factor of the interest rate. Thus, we can perform a simple experiment to gauge the 
likely implications of differences in capital shares for our results, given data on capital shares αi and a reasonable value 
for gwgr .
We obtain values of αi for manufacturing industries from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011), as discussed earlier. To obtain an 
estimate of gwgr for use in a simple simulation, notice that expression (8) is equivalent to











for some arbitrary industry j. Thus, we can estimate whether dif-
ferences in capital shares are an important factor of structural change by estimating equation (9) in cross-sectional US 
data, and seeing whether capital shares carry a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Moreover, the coeﬃcient on capital shares equals 





so that estimating this equation provides all the inputs necessary for us to simulate structural change in 
the model using equation (8) and assuming gwgr is relatively constant across time and space. For manufacturing, we measure 
αi using the INDSTAT4 database 1977–1990, as one minus the labor share of value added in each industry, as in Ilyina and 
Samaniego (2011). We do not have comparable data for broad sectors. To be consistent with our earlier estimates of ε, we 
follow Ilyina and Samaniego (2012) in estimating (9) with data from Jorgenson et al. (2007) to measure Gi and gi . This way, 
if we assume αi is the same in all industries, we replicate the procedure that yields their estimate of ε for manufacturing.
When we estimate (9), we ﬁnd several things. First, the estimate of ε hardly changes, from 3.75 to 3.77, and remains 
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Second, the coeﬃcient on αi is signiﬁcant at the 10% level only, and implies a value of 
gw
gr
of about 1.02 (although statistical signiﬁcance improves to the 5% level if we allow for heteroskedasticity). This provides 
weak evidence that capital shares could matter for structural change within manufacturing, while underlining the fact that 
productivity growth differences are important.
We now simulate the model again in two ways to gauge the impact of capital intensity differences. First we use (8)
to generate model industry shares, using our estimates of gwgr . Second, we isolate the role of different capital shares by 
assuming that all industry productivity growth rates are equal, but allowing capital shares to differ.
We ﬁnd that allowing for capital share differences preserves the U shape: see Fig. 14. We do this with η = 0 (when the 
U-shape partly depended on intercepts) and with η = 1 (a value of η which displays monotonic coeﬃcients), suggesting that 
the presence of differences in αi does not signiﬁcantly affect the results. Moreover, when we simulate the model assuming 
TFP growth rates are the same (i.e. gi = g j ∀i, j) we ﬁnd that there is no U shape any more, only a downward slope. 
Investigating the coeﬃcients β (x) that represent the slopes of the relationship between income and the Gini coeﬃcients in 
each of the rolling windows in equation (1), we ﬁnd that they are almost ﬂat and close to zero when we impose equality of 
productivity growth rates. In other words, the model itself with capital share differences generates no noticeable structural 
change: the downward slope in Ginis with respect to income is purely generated by the initial conditions, which happen 
to describe the downward sloping portion of the curve. We conclude that differences in capital shares are not signiﬁcantly 
related to the stages of diversiﬁcation, neither in the data nor in the model.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper ﬁlls an important gap in the literature on structural change and growth by accounting for the broadest pattern 
of structural transformation along the development path: the “stages of diversiﬁcation.” We develop a multi-sector model in 
which different productivity growth rates across industries and sectors lead to structural transformation, and ﬁnd that the 
calibrated model accounts for the “stages.” The results are robust to a variety of extensions and modiﬁcations, and hold both 
across sectors and within manufacturing. We also show that the dynamics of individual industries and sectors are consistent 
with the productivity mechanism of structural transformation. This does not rule out a role for other factors of structural 
transformation: however, the paper provides quantitative evidence that productivity differences can account on their own 
for the detailed dynamics of industrial structure along the development path. Importantly, the theory also indicates that the 
direction of resource ﬂows may vary depending on the level of aggregation – because of different elasticities of substitution 
– a prediction that the data conﬁrm.
Our work also complements the literature on the link between trade and development by establishing a benchmark 
characterizing the evolution of economic structure in a closed economy. The literature tends to interpret the “stages of di-
versiﬁcation” as being related to trade.15 However, the survey of Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) ﬁnds that “empirical work 
has consistently documented a lack of major labor reallocation across sectors” in response to trade liberalization: trade does 
15 See IW, and also Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003), Rodrik (2008) and Imbs et al. (2012).
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Fig. 14. Industry structure along the development path allowing for capital share variation. The left panels represent the relationship between in-
come and specialization within manufacturing, based on the IW regression where GINIc,t equals αˆc (x) + βˆ (x)GDPc,t + εc,t , for GDPc,t in the interval 
[x− /2, x+ /2]. The right panels represent the coeﬃcients βˆ (x) from these regressions. The upper panels represent the model with αi variation and 
η = 0 (no industry-speciﬁc productivity convergence). The middle panel is the model with η equal to one. The bottom panel is the model with αi variation 
across industries setting gi = g j∀i, j.
not appear to be a key determinant of structural change. This indicates that growth-theoretic considerations are likely to be 
more important determinants of structural transformation than trade, motivating our study. In any case, the importance of 
international trade as a determinant of structural transformation along the development path cannot be properly assessed 
until we understand how economic structure evolves under autarky. If a closed economy can generate the stages of diversiﬁ-
cation using well-understood and empirically supported mechanisms, Ockham’s principle of parsimony indicates that a key 
role for trade in generating the “stages” should not be assumed a priori. Indeed, we show that even in a closed economy 
persistent total factor productivity (TFP) growth differences across industries are suﬃcient to generate a U-shaped pattern 
of specialization that is very close to the pattern in the data.
In our paper we take initial conditions as given for our quantitative experiments. The results suggest that poorer coun-
tries tend to begin specialized in industries where TFP growth is low. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it 
is interesting to think about why initial conditions might be biased in this way. One possibility is that there are non-
homothetic preferences (see Kongsamut et al., 2001), so that consumption patterns in poor countries are dominated by 
subsistence considerations that wear off later. If manufacturing industries that produce goods necessary for subsistence (e.g. 
food products) happen to have slow TFP growth, whereas sectors that are necessary for subsistence (e.g. agriculture) hap-
pen to have rapid TFP growth, then we would observe these initial conditions. Another possibility that does not necessarily 
hinge on non-homothetic preferences involves the transition from a “traditional” technology with low productivity growth 
to a “modern” technology with more rapid productivity growth. Ngai (2004) shows that small differences across countries 
in barriers to technology adoption can lead to very large differences in income by delaying the transition from the “tra-
ditional” to the “modern” technologies. Initial conditions would be determined by the traditional technology and the date 
of transition between technologies. The idea that the transition between the “traditional” and “modern” technologies could 
explain economic structure as well as income levels is an interesting topic for future research.
Appendix A. Alternative productivity measures
We measure productivity using the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database. The data are more disaggregated that the 
ISIC3 Classiﬁcation we need for the UNIDO data, so we aggregate them using Domar weights.
In addition, we use an alternative way of measuring TFP growth rates. Using the UNIDO dataset, we compute the TFP 
growth rates of 28 UNIDO manufacturing industries of the United States using the following equation:
ln(TFPit) = ln(Yit) − (1− α) ln(Lit) − α ln (Kit) (10)
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Fig. 15. IW non-parametric regression using simulated industry concentration measures based on equation (6) using INDSTAT3 TFP growth rates, and based 
on equation (5) using INDSTAT3 price growth rates.
where Yit is the production index. This requires computing the capital stock at the industry level. The UNIDO dataset 
provides investment data but not capital stock data Kit , so we use a perpetual inventory method
Kit+1 = (1− δ)Kit + Iitqit (11)
to compute growth rate of capital stock, where Iit is investment and qit represents investment-speciﬁc technical progress.16
Then the growth rate of Kit is the sum of growth rates of I and q. We set qit = gtiq , so that growth rates of qi vary across 
industries. We use growth factor giq from IS. Also, δ = 0.06 and α = 0.3. These are standard numbers in the literature.17
Then, if  (x) is the log growth rate of x over the time period in the data, note that
ln gi =  (Yi) − (1− α)(Li) − α (Ki) . (12)
We obtain  (Yi) and (Li) from UNIDO, and set  (Ki) =  (Ii) + log giq , which is the long run relationship in (11).
In addition, equation (5) suggests using inverse price growth rates to measure industry TFP growth. The price index is 
computed using value added divided by the production index from the UNIDO dataset.18 Both TFP and price growth rates 
are averages over the period 1963–1992 (data are available upon request). TFP growth rates computed this way are highly 
correlated with those derived from the NBER data, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.6 (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). 
The TFP growth and price growth series based on UNIDO data are highly negatively correlated with a coeﬃcient of −0.9
(signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). All of this is encouraging as to the robustness of the productivity measures.
We simulate industry shares following equation (5) for UNIDO price growth and (6) for TFP growth and apply non-
parametric methodology to model simulated Gini coeﬃcients on income. Again, we obtain a U-shape in both cases, see 
Fig. 15.
Finally, using the model itself, we can map between productivity growth rates and changes over time in employment 
shares by means of equation (6), setting the errors t = 0. We use this procedure to back out a measure of productivity 
growth we call gmediani , which will be the median productivity growth factor implied by changes in employment patterns 
around the world (details below). We repeat the above experiments using gmediani for all countries, again providing a clean 
experiment that abstracts from all country differences other than initial conditions.
All that is required to use (6) to back out productivity growth values from country employment data is knowing g jct for 
some benchmark industry j in each country. We assume that in all countries and dates the productivity growth rate is the 
same in industry 342, Printing and Publishing. We choose this industry because in the NBER data g j  1, for industry 342, 
i.e. there is essentially no total factor productivity growth in this industry. At the sector level, we assume that productivity 
growth is the same in all countries for Community, Social and Personal Services, which has the lowest gi value among the 
sectors.
Having generated series for gict as described above, we compute gic , the average of the time series for each country and 
industry. The measure gmediani is simply the median value of gic for each i. Note that, since the country with the median 
16 We allow for investment-speciﬁc technical progress because the model is one with many industries where productivity growth rates in capital-
producing industries may be different from productivity growth elsewhere.
17 The value of δ is from Greenwood et al. (1997) and is a value typical in models with investment-speciﬁc technical change, in other words where gq > 1.
18 Recall that value added vit = pit yit . The assumption is that growth in the UNIDO industrial production index proxies for growth in yit .
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Fig. 16. Patterns of specialization in the basic model using gmediani . This is the median TFP growth rate across countries measured using employment 
patterns as described in the text.
value will vary by industry i, no country’s employment patterns correspond to gmediani , even though g
median
i is derived from 
the employment data.
First, it turns out that gmediani is very highly correlated with the values of gi calibrated using NBER data. Within manufac-
turing the correlation is 0.40 and across sectors it is 0.70, both signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Second, Fig. 16 displays 
the link between specialization and development using the basic model, using gmediani as a measure of productivity growth. 
The curves using gmediani provide an extremely tight ﬁt to the data. Also, with g
median
i the coeﬃcients are also monotonic and 
negative below about $5000 even when η = 0. Thus, the model essentially reproduces the empirical curves with gmediani .
Appendix B. Intermediate goods
We have abstracted from the existence of intermediate goods. There is a question as to whether results might change if 
we allowed for intermediates. For one thing, when there are intermediate goods, Ngai and Samaniego (2009) point out that 
TFP growth measures computed using gross output data (as is the case for the NBER numbers) understate TFP growth in a 
value added model.
Consider that the input–output matrix is largely diagonal: industries tend to use intermediates produced within the 








where xit are intermediate goods and ψ is the intermediate goods share. Producers solve the problem
max
kit ,nit ,xit
{pit yit − wtnit − rt Kit − pitxit} . (14)




pit y˜it − wtnit − rt Kit
}
, (15)
where y˜it = yit − xit is value added in terms of good i, with the value-added production function








1−ψ − ψ 11−ψ
]
. (16)
While (16) is of the same form as (7), note that the growth factor of A˜it is equal to g
1
1−ψ
i > gi .
At the same time, this does not matter for the results. Recall that what affects rates of structural change in the model 
is the combination of gi and ε, not one or the other in isolation. If we regress the log value added growth on the log 
real value-added productivity factor g
1
1−ψ
i , we would obtain a different value of epsilon. Recall that (6) is equivalent to 
logGi = α + (ε − 1) log gi + i where α = logG j − log g j for some arbitrary industry j and i is any unmodeled noise. If we 
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use gi instead of g
1
1−ψ
i in this equation, we would have an estimated elasticity ε˜ where ε˜ − 1 = (ε − 1) (1− ψ) – a lower 



























which is exactly equivalent quantitatively to patterns of structural change in our model without intermediates. Thus, signif-
icant off-diagonal elements in the input–output tables would be required to change our quantitative results.
A similar intuition regards the possibility of adjustment costs in the reallocation of capital cross industries. Given other 
parameters, capital adjustment costs could slow the reallocation of resources across industries. However in the presence of 
adjustment costs the value of ε required to match the link between industry growth and TFP growth in the data would be 
larger. Thus, results would not be affected.
Appendix C. Industry TFP growth data
Below we report the industry productivity growth rates used in the model calibrations. See the text for the measurement 
strategies.
Table 1
Productivity growth across broad ILO sectors. The manufacturing sector is composed of the 28 ISIC2 industries. The value for Manu-
facturing in the table is the average over the sample period in the NBER data.
ILO 1-digit classiﬁcation (9 sectors) Growth factor g
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 1.027
2 Mining and Quarrying 0.995
3 Manufacturing∗ 1.012
4 Electricity, Gas and Water 0.987
5 Construction 0.983
6 Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels 1.011
7 Transport, Storage and Communication 1.006
8 Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 0.982
9 Community, Social and Personal Services 0.974
Table 2
NBER TFP growth rates for the ISIC revision 2 industry classiﬁcation. Source: NBER productivity database and 
authors’ calculations.
Industry ISIC code NBER TFP growth rate







Wood products 331 0.0113
Furniture, except metal 332 0.0066
Paper and products 341 0.0088
Printing and publishing 342 −0.0022
Industrial chemicals 351 0.0214
Other chemicals 352 0.0135
Petroleum reﬁneries 353 0.0196
Misc. pet. and coal products 354 0.0223
Rubber products 355 0.0142
Plastic products 356 0.0339
Pottery, china, earthenware 361 0.0078
Glass and products 362 0.0051
Other non-metallic mineral prod. 369 0.0120
Iron and steel 371 0.0047
Non-ferrous metals 372 0.0016
Fabricated metal products 381 0.0029
Machinery, except electrical 382 0.0285
Machinery, electric 383 0.0347
Transport equipment 384 0.0160
Prof. & sci. equip. 385 0.0126
Other manufactured prod. 390 0.0089
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Fig. 17. Fitted measures of industry concentration (Ginis) for the data in IW and for model-generated pseudodata, each minus the mean value of the Gini 
(GINI (x) − GINI for both model and the data). The left ﬁgure is ILO data and simulations. The right ﬁgure is for manufacturing data and simulations.
The manufacturing measures are computed from the NBER manufacturing productivity database. That database is at the 
4-digit SIC level, so we aggregate the measures using Domar weights. The sector level values are computed using relative 
price growth information from the US BEA. First, we compute the value for TFP growth in manufacturing using the NBER 
manufacturing productivity database. Then, the productivity growth factor in any given sector is the value for manufacturing 
times the factor by which the price of the good produced in that sector declines relative to manufacturing.
We found that the standard deviation over time for gi for any particular manufacturing industry was under 5 percent for 
11 industries, and under 10 percent for 25 industries. This indicates that the values of gi are capturing adequately a stable 
feature of productivity growth in each industry.
Petroleum Reﬁneries (ISIC 353) and Miscellaneous Coal and Petroleum Products (ISIC 354) have standard deviations of 
33 and 25 percent respectively, which is not surprising since these industries are sensitive to ﬂuctuations in oil prices: in 
particular ISIC 354 has a spike in measured productivity in 1980, and ISIC 353 has a spike in 1981.
We use the measure “tfp5”, results are similar using “tfp4”.
We use total factor productivity rather than labor productivity because it is without loss of generality if factor shares 
are the same across industries (so the same values of gi can be used in a model with capital, such as the one in the 
technical appendix). To see this, suppose the production function includes capital. In this case, yit = Aitkαitn1−αit . The ﬁrst 
order conditions can be written pitαyit/Kit = rt (where rt is the interest rate) and pit(1 − α)yit/nit = wt . Dividing one 
condition by the other we get that Kitnit =
αwt
(1−α)rt . Then, dividing any of the ﬁrst order conditions for industry i by that for j




Appendix D. Goodness of ﬁt
We examine how well the model matches the pattern of specialization in the data. To do this, we take the empirical 
and model-generated specialization curves and plot them in a single ﬁgure. In order to focus on the pattern (rather than 
the level) of specialization, from each of these curves we subtract the mean Gini coeﬃcient, so that each curve is centered 
around zero. Fig. 17 shows that the sector model matches the data quite well for a variety of values of η, whereas the 
manufacturing results provide too much diversiﬁcation below the turning point, and too much specialization after it. This 
suggests that in the manufacturing case could be some force mitigating the productivity mechanism: it would be interesting 
in future work to identify that mechanism.
Appendix. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2015.06.003.
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